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Securing Defence Rights in Transnational Proceedings 
 
By Marianne L. Wade1  
 
Abstract: 
This paper identifies and analyses problems and weaknesses standing in the way of the provision of an 
effective defence in transnational criminal proceedings. Drawing upon some key findings of the EuroNEEDs 
study, it extrapolates results from that examination of EU criminal justice as valid for all transnational 
justice settings. It is argued that the failure to recognise legally the difference between national and 
transnational proceedings leads to a lacuna. Transnational criminal law and justice mechanisms are 
recognised as developed above all as tools of repressive criminal procedure leaving individuals facing them 
stripped of their constitutional identities and corresponding protective rights. It is argued that those 
creating transnational criminal law and justice mechanisms must recognise and provide for a more 
balanced system to avoid such contexts acting as constitutional loop-holes and to ensure the provision of 
defence rights and procedural safeguards in such proceedings. 
 
Key words:  
Defence rights, transnational criminal law, transnational criminal justice, EU criminal justice, procedural 
safeguards, constitutional guarantees, EuroNEEDs. 
 
I. Introduction 
The current trend in European criminal justice is undoubtedly prosecution focused. Despite the considerable 
efforts undertaken on defence rights in accordance with the Roadmap2 developed to implement the relevant 
part of the Stockholm programme3, the past years have seen vital parts of access to lawyer rights – 
particularly legal aid – set aside.4 Quite apart from classic arguments over sovereignty concerns, such 
proposals fail because they are regarded as requiring budgetary commitments from the member states.5 
 
Nevertheless, it seems important to stress from the outset, that its subject matter – securing defence rights in 
transnational proceedings carried out within the EU context – is no more an unreachable pipe-dream than 
was the idea of an EU-wide effective arrest warrant before the EAW Framework Decision introduced that 
much praised mutation of mutual legal assistance in 2001. 
 
The article 6 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights leaves us in no doubt that the fair trial 
rights it intends to protect can only be satisfied where there is equality of arms. Criminal justice 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a presentation made to the Challenges of Transnational Investigations hosted by the Institute of 
Judicial Administration, School of Law, University of Birmingham and co-funded by the Hercule Programme of the 
European Commission in March 2013. A full conference report is available at: 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/ija/news/2013/challenges-transnational-investigations-report.aspx 
2 Resolution of the Council of 30th November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings (2009/C 295/01) O.J. 4.12.2009 C 295/1. 
3 Notices from the European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies. European Council. The Stockholm 
Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens (2010/C 115/01) O.J. 4.5.2010. C 115/1. 
4 A full overview of progress made under the Roadmap can be found on the pages of the European Criminal Bar 
association: http://www.ecba.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=360:roadmap-
stockholm&catid=65:procedural-safeguards&Itemid=44 Note under the separate “legal aid” category the evolution of 
measure C including the decoupling to legal aid from it. 
5 So e.g., Baroness Ludford at a European Parliament panel on defence rights in the EU, October 2012. This argument, 
however, becomes less credible upon closer reflection. Given the importance now attached to the notion of EU 
citizenship by the Treaties - see e.g. article 20 TFEU – such grounds for non-progress in liberty enhancing measures 
become problematic when contrasted with the member states’ ability to commit resources to e.g. the European arrest 
warrant and indeed the availability of Union funds for criminal justice mechanisms – see e.g. Eurojust’s Legal Service’s 
“Report on Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) and Eurojust’s JITs funding 2/2011 1 February – 30 April 2011” which 
reports on the second funding programme (HOME/2009/ISEC/FP/C2-000000576), available at: 
www.nij.bg/FileHandler.ashx?folderID=153&fileID=1954 (last accessed 18.06.2014). 
See the current Eurojust “Call for Proposals for Financial Assistance to Joint Investigation Teams” 2014/4 available at: 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/JITs/JITs%20funding%20application%20procedure/JITs%20Funding%20Cal
l%20for%20Proposals%202014-4/JITsFunding_call-for-proposals-2014-4_EN.pdf (last accessed 18.06.2014). 
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developments within the context of the European Union have long been subject to criticism that they side-
line defence rights as well as the structural position of the defence in such cases. At heart, these criticisms 
naturally bear the accusation that action within the EU context is thus undermining such protected rights. The 
status quo as reported above would appear to confirm such criticism. 
 
Few would deny that the criminal justice related developments associated with the Area of Freedom Security 
and Justice thus far are strongly marked by matters of executive priority and thus prosecution interest. In a 
large-scale empirical project to explore the factual problems associated with European cases – the 
EuroNEEDs study, I thus set out also to determine the experiences and position of the defence in such cases. 
This paper draws upon and analyses these research results. In a first section, the key EuroNEEDs results are 
briefly presented. The paper then goes on to reflect more broadly on what the securing of defence rights 
means within the context of EU and broader transnational criminal law. The traditional means of providing 
for defence work are contrasted with the framework, nature and reality of criminal justice in transnational 
contexts and the resulting mismatch and problems explored. In a final section a number of steps to ensure 
better rights protection are considered.   
 
II. The EuroNEEDs Study and Key Results 
The EuroNEEDs project was an independent academic study was carried out by the author at the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. It was co-financed by the Hercule Programme of the 
European Commission and only feasible due to the work of a large project team. It was a comparative study 
entailing interviews were conducted with 132 prosecutors and 60 defence lawyers in 18 EU member states 
as well as practitioners working within OLAF, at Europol and Eurojust. Practitioners were questioned as to 
the challenges they face when investigating and prosecuting cases with a European dimension. 
 
It may plausibly be argued that the EU – as a supra-national instance – has interests beyond the collective concerns of 
the member states. In relation to crimes against its budget, the EU’s interests may, in some cases, even be contrary to 
those of member states. In relation to cross-border crime, the EU has sought to make provision for comprehensive 
investigation and prosecution of these,6 often significantly boosting the reach of member state action to ensure a 
different quality of investigation and prosecution. The legitimacy of EU action in such contexts – as opposed to work by 
any other institution negotiating trans-national treaties – is lent particularly by the specific nature of the EU. As a supra-
national governance level providing for the free movement of goods, persons, products and capital,7 it plausibly 
facilitates criminal activity of different sorts. The member states and EU institutions are committed to ensuring these 
freedoms are not abused.8 The project design consequently features a presumption that the EU bears a particular 
responsibility for combatting crimes it facilitates as a community; it must seek to protect the legitimacy and to avoid the 
abuse of its fundamental principles. 
 
The study, however, equally regards EU citizenship as a core feature of the post-Lisbon EU, and therefore 
also conceptualised the work of defence lawyers as central to criminal justice. Consequently, the study also 
investigated in how far the jurisdictional borders within the Union may impede defence work as usually 
foreseen within criminal justice systems. Key aspects of this part of the study are relevant to the argument of 
this article.9 
 
The first clear finding is that the very fact of transnational evidence gathering opens up concerns that defence 
rights and procedural safeguards will be less well catered for, as prosecutors do not appear to feel the same 
sense of responsibility for securing, or indeed the ability to secure, them in such scenarios.10 The level of 
rights enforced will depend strongly on the forum in which any activity takes place. Given the enormous 
                                                 
6 E.g. via Europol analysis, Eurojust support, joint investigation teams etc. 
7 See Barnard, C. The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
8 See e.g. Carrera, S. An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Government Package: Preventing abuse by 
EU Member States of freedom of movement? (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, No47/March 2012) pp. 1-
28. 
9 It is not possible to present these results except in a very abbreviated manner here. A report of these results can be 
found on the website reporting upon the conference at which the presentation - upon which this paper is based - was 
made. See Wade, M. Securing Defence Rights in Transnational Proceedings - Central EuroNEEDs Results 
(Birmingham, 2015) available at: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/ija/news/2013/challenges-
transnational-investigations-report.aspx 
10 See results relating to questions on ensuring adherence to procedural safeguards, Wade (2015) op cit.  
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variation in regulation, safeguards and rights across the EU,11 this clearly means the level of defence rights 
factually secured will also differ greatly. Even at a very basic level, the mere trans-nationality of such 
proceedings creates significant hurdles for the defence. Where a case involves countries with similar 
standards, the factual problem will be less prominent. As Hodgson points out, European proceedings are 
currently a lottery: “Safeguards for the accused vary across jurisdictions, according to the roles and 
responsibilities of other legal actors at various points in the process – some are stronger during the 
investigation, others at the trial hearing. A defendant may have the best, or the worst, of both worlds.”12 
 
This challenge is evident in other insights provided by the EuroNEEDs study. Defence lawyers indicate 
clearly that they feel the equality of arms to be compromised in European cases.13 A majority of 63 % 
responding that the defence is disadvantaged in international cases as opposed to ones involving national 
institutions only.14  
 
Perhaps more concerning than the feeling of disadvantage in European cases is the apparent despondency 
demonstrated by the defence lawyers interviewed by the EuroNEEDs study.15 Often a kind of "anything 
might help" attitude was evident reflecting just how desperate defence lawyers feel the status quo to be. As a 
consequence, defence practitioners demonstrated a surprisingly high level of support for almost all potential 
remedies suggested. 32% for example support the idea of a European public prosecutor supervising coercive 
measures, 55% a defence network (nut only 25% a supra-national defence instance) whilst 63% support an 
approximation of law. These contrasted interestingly with the respective views of prosecutors.16 It is 
noticeable that defence lawyers generally display greater readiness to endorse reform proposals than 
prosecutors. This would appear to support the notion that they perceive a more urgent need for change than 
their prosecutorial colleagues. 
 
A fundamental difference in the experiences and perceptions of prosecutors and defence lawyers is further 
highlighted by 70 % of responding prosecutors denying the emergence of a parallel criminal justice system 
to deal with European cases, but only 57 % of their defence colleagues doing the same.17 This is perhaps 
indicative of defence lawyers finding such cases so difficult to handle, they feel as if they are on terra nova. 
Clearly as only defence lawyers are left feeling this way, this may impact upon the level playing field 
required for an equality of arms to exist. 
 
The belief of approximately one third of all national prosecutors interviewed that mutual recognition (the 
"cornerstone" of European co-operation) measures generally disadvantage the defence is particularly 
interesting. The largest proportion reporting recognising difficulties (11%) did so only at a theoretical level. 
Intriguingly, however, 9% testify to finding European cases easier to handle than purely domestic ones. In 
other words, they experience the defence as less able to mount opposition to their cases.18 
 
This is surely as strong a signal of a weakened defence as there can be; it is difficult to imagine a clearer 
indication of the defence being side-lined than this final point and it must act as a serious warning that 
effective defence is endangered in trans-nationalised proceedings. That prosecutors should notice and record 
this fact – even a relatively small proportion of them - is intriguing. Normally one would anticipate that 
transnational cases are generally more difficult to handle so lacking pressure from the defence leading to 
                                                 
11 See Wade, M. Developing a Criminal Justice System within the European Union (Brussels: European Parliament, 
2014) and Ligeti, K. Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union. Volume 1 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
12 Hodgson, J. S. 'Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in Europe: A Comparative Perspective', New Criminal Law Review, 14 
(4), (2011), p. 620. 
13 The study utilised the concept of “European cases” intending to indicate such cases as of a scale and nature meaning 
they should be viewed as of equal concern to all European citizens and tax-payers. These pertain particularly to crimes 
victimizing the EU (usually compromising its financial interests) and certain types of transnational crimes. Where a 
closer definition of the latter was required by the study, reference was made to trafficking human beings, drug 
smuggling and corruption. For this reason, in what follows reference will be made to European cases in relation to study 
results but international cases when transnational contexts more broadly are being discussed. 
14 See figures 1 and 2 and their analysis in Wade (2015) op cit. 
15 See figure 3 and analysis in Wade (2015) op cit. 
16 See figures 10, 11 and 12 and their analysis in Wade (2015) op cit. 
17 See figures 4 and 5 and their analysis in Wade (2015) op cit. 
18 See figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 and their analysis in Wade (2015) op cit. 
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such statements must be taken as very significant indeed. This strongly confirms the defence claims 
highlighted above that they lack tools or the requisite status to act effectively in these cases.  
 
 
III. The Problems faced by Defence Practitioners 
 
The EuroNEEDs study was conducted as an exploration of European criminal law. As such, its results 
logically relate to the very specific context of proceedings taking place within the EU influenced by the 
institutions and mechanisms established in that context during the past 15 years of criminal justice co-
operation.19 These reflect considerable advancement in the field of criminal justice co-operation with 
mechanisms such as the EAW perhaps best described as mutations of mutual legal assistance. These results 
are thus to be associated with a very particular context. Nevertheless, certainly as far as the problems faced 
by defence practitioners are concerned, it is suggested that in their core these are similar to those faced by 
defence lawyers in all transnational proceedings, perhaps in a more starkly obvious way. Problems are 
caused on the one hand by the mere fact of a case involving more than one jurisdiction or legal framework, 
clearly a common feature of any trans-nationalised proceedings. Particular problems are caused by the level 
of informality marking the work of EU prosecutors and investigators. This is formally encouraged by mutual 
recognition instruments (above all the EAW) specific to the EU. Nevertheless, even the EU context features 
this special level of trust only to a point; experiences with the EAW have also sewn mistrust.20 Joint 
investigation teams, specialist anti-terrorist, drug and human trafficking combatting supra-national 
organisations, Interpol, liaison magistrates, etc. are available in broader transnational settings and will 
provide for less formal exchange in these too. Although instruments of mutual recognition, particularly the 
EAW, are specifically attacked as undermining human rights because they do away with traditional hurdles 
(such as double criminality) and have been used inappropriately, it would seem that where this criticism 
arises legitimately, such problems can often be associated with the ease (and indeed inappropriateness of 
use). They have become the focus of attention because they represent a step forward in cooperation and 
problems associated with this more generally become accentuated.21 For this reason, it is submitted that a 
certain level of extrapolation is possible for the provision of defence in trans-nationalised proceedings more 
broadly from these EU-based findings. 
 
If an effective defence is to be possible, a context of fairness secured by procedural rights is required. 
Fundamental to that is the requirement of equality of arms between prosecution and defence.22 The 
EuroNEEDs results highlight some problems relating to this latter, central principle.23 Defence lawyer 
interviewees further expressly point to the problems caused by the accommodation of informal decision-
making on particularly prosecutors’ behalf. Decisive points during an investigation and leading up to the 
lodging of charges are discussed by international groups of investigators and prosecutors and conclusions 
drawn based upon their collective judgement of what is appropriate. In formal, legal terms, however, only a 
decision by a national authority (e.g. to search premises or to lodge charges) is made and will be reviewable, 
if the rules of that jurisdiction allow it, only as such. In other words, legally the trans-national nature of such 
decisions is nowhere to be seen. Where proceedings are steered and deeply affected by decisions (such as 
forum) for which prosecutors cannot be held (comprehensively) accountable, clearly a defence lawyer has no 
legal point onto which to anchor his or her work. Given the fundamental fact in transnational proceedings 
that these will be conducted with greater distance to those individuals affected by them, this is a particular 
problem: prosecutors are much less likely to feel they owe a duty to those they make decisions about (whilst 
there is considerable evidence demonstrating that prosecutors feel such a duty to citizens or residents of their 
                                                 
19 See Klip, A. European Criminal Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012) and Satzger, H. International and European 
Criminal Law (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2012).  
20 See Albers, P., Beauvais, P., Bohnert, J.-F., Böse, M., Langbroek, P. Renier, A. and Wahl, T. Towards a Common 
Evaluation Framework to Assess Mutual Trust in the Field of EU Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Copy on 
file with author, 2013) 
21 One may also note that by preventing the abuse of freedom of movement across the EU such mechanisms help to 
protect other human rights. 
22 Equality of arms is a well established element of the right to a fair trial - see N. Mole and C. Harby The Right to a 
Fair Trial: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 6 ECHR (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2006), p. 46 et seq. and 
ECtHR Dombo Beheer v The Netherlands, 27.10.1993, Application no. 14448/88. 
23 See Wade (2015) op cit. 
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jurisdictions24). In other words, informal decisions are made about subjects more likely stripped of any 
characteristic of meaning to those making such decisions whilst defence lawyers are left with few footholds 
to gain insights into proceedings (and decision-making during their course) let alone to perform their usual 
role. 
 
 
III.a. A Brief Reflection on the Equality of Arms  
Whilst there is not scope to explore the meaning of the equality of arms fully in this paper, it is nevertheless 
important to reflect briefly upon what it means in such contexts. Fundamentally the idea is, of course, that 
the defence and prosecution face each other on a level playing field. This is traditionally imbued with the 
greatest import in the trial context although in transnational contexts the question is whether certain points in 
the investigation do not also require consideration. These contexts are, however, interesting for other reasons 
too. 
 
Clearly the majority of defence lawyers interviewed by the EuroNEEDs study feel disadvantaged in 
European cases. The above statistics do provide some basis to believe this to be particular to European 
criminal law given the presence of mutual recognition instruments in that context. However, one might well 
expect the defence to complain of inequality when facing highly specialized prosecutors, especially working 
in networks across borders something, which does not occur only at the EU level. A closer look at both 
prosecutorial and defence responses, also indicates that there are further nuances to this scenario, however.  
 
Amongst the defence lawyers interviewed, there is also a significant minority who do not feel disadvantaged 
and who feel well placed to cope with European cases. Occasionally there are also astonished and frustrated 
statements by prosecutors to be heard in their additional comments; accounts of them chasing highly potent 
perpetrators across borders, always one step behind. These statements require further exploration and that 
one proceeds with caution. The can be little doubt that we are examining a context in which the idea of an 
equality of arms is appropriate. Criminal justice is an acrimonious matter, especially when dealing with the 
more serious criminal phenomena associated with transnational and the European criminal law context. 
Prosecutors and defence lawyers present different sides, perhaps not of a battlefield but certainly of a very 
controversial context. Moreover, their words should be recognized as part of such a setting, especially when 
relating to the respective other side. Nevertheless, there are doubtless also powerful perpetrators involved in 
these fields of criminal activity. The crime of choice in European cases currently the focus of reform 
proposals such as the EPPO, is massive financial fraud against "state" (namely the EU’s) coffers. Given what 
we know about fraud and similar white-collar crime,25 it would be extremely strange not to anticipate the 
participation of powerful and wise criminal actors. The next associated truth with this profile of socio-
economically powerful suspects, is that they can afford good defence lawyers. Good, well-resourced defence 
lawyers are naturally capable of working in international networks – indeed, it is precisely the quality of 
network clients pay for - and with great efficiency. It requires no stretch of the imagination to imagine 
prosecutors hampered and disadvantaged when facing such scenarios. 
 
There is certainly evidence in the EuroNEEDS data of such differences between defence lawyers and their 
experiences. This is clearly a more subtle point relating to an equality of arms argument, albeit a different 
perspective on this. Where a network of professionals is well resourced, knowledgeable and feels at home in 
the international context, this is a powerful force to contend with. One which can see state powers challenged 
and stretched to their limits and indeed beyond. The central point to remember is that European criminal 
justice mechanisms were created to ensure that prosecutors have international networks to rely upon and 
even, if necessary, increasingly powerful, supra-national institutions to support them in their work, to help 
create specific, specialized networks or teams and to hurry components along if necessary. No action at the 
European level has been taken to ensure defendants can rely upon such networks. Access to those defence 
networks, which exist, or creation of them is plausible only for those who have the financial resources to pay 
for them. And thus our consideration of equality of arms in the criminal justice context leads us to a brutal, if 
almost banal and certainly incurable, truth about inequality of arms more broadly. The rich are at an 
                                                 
24 See Albers et al (2013) op cit. 
25 See e.g. Friedrichs, D. Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Modern Society (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengae 
Learning, 2010) p. 329 et seq. Seminal: Sutherland, E.H. ‘White-Collar Crime’ American Sociological Review Vol. 5, 
No.1, February 1940, pp. 2-10. 
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advantage. The problem is that this reality is currently being magnified by our governments in European and 
other trans-national contexts. The inequality of arms in European criminal justice cases currently 
disadvantages the impecunious suspect. That surely is not what the European Union was intended to 
achieve? 
 
III.b. The Structures of Defence Provision 
The majority of defence lawyers questioned by the EuroNEEDS study are experts who have dealt with 
mechanisms and institutions related to criminality of, at most, moderate seriousness. A very significant 
minority – reflecting the pool also interviewed on the prosecutorial side – are experts dealing in financial 
crime, sometimes working in larger firms. Not entirely surprisingly, the experiences of these groups of 
defence practitioners are diverse. It is crucial to recognise that defence lawyers are practitioners with a range 
of professional interests. One of those is also to sustain themselves and, at least in some cases, to profit-
maximise.  
 
Given that defence lawyers are organised entirely differently to other criminal justice practitioners and as 
such subject to greater structural diversity, it is perhaps not surprising that they do not speak with one voice. 
There is clearly at least a section of this group of practitioners with a clear interest in objecting to any state 
interference in the structuring of defence work currently performed by an elite well paid to do so. 
Unquestionably, there are sound, philosophical reasons to object to state involvement in and potential 
influence over defence work. It is, however, also important to recognise that there are also pecuniary 
interests in reserving such work for private firms. As long as member states fail to recognise that there may 
be specific reasons not to respect this organic state within transnational proceedings, the equality of arms 
debate in such contexts must be recognised as complex. 
 
III.c. Legal Classification of Trans-national Criminal Justice Activity 
The threat to the equality of arms stems, above all, from the fiction that the European level – legally and 
institutionally; like all other transnational contexts - „adds no value.“ This is extraordinary given that 
European institutions tend to strive above all to justify their existence via value added. Legally, however, the 
member states force us to the fiction that they do not. As evaluated by the Court of Justice of the EU in the 
so-called OLAF case law,26 control rests with member state authorities because only they can finally decide 
whether to instigate criminal proceedings or not. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, this leaves us with a legal 
result that an investigation instigated, co-ordinated and run via meetings at Eurojust or Europol are no 
different to “normal,” national investigations run locally. 
 
This cannot, however, really be allowed to stand. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) case-
law consistently sees the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) evaluating the fairness of any given 
process as a whole.27 The ability of the defence to participate and be heard at various stages during 
proceedings provides a balance and equality of arms as we currently accept it.28 Investigations run at the 
European level are currently marked by informality of decision-making29; praised by prosecutors and 
investigators (understandably) for allowing them to work swiftly and efficiently. The problem is obvious 
from a defence perspective, however. Prosecutors and investigators can make decisions about the entire run 
of an investigation, up to an including the forum in which to pursue a prosecution, entirely amongst 
themselves. Evidence will be gathered in a number of states, coercive measures imposed and overall 
jurisdiction decided according to decisions made by national prosecutors working together, probably 
weighing a number of factors and interests entirely informally. The defence is left at best only able to contest 
the result of such deliberations reflected only in the decision of a single national prosecutor in accordance to 
                                                 
26 For exploration of this point see Allegrezza, S. and Agostini, B. Judicial Supervision of Criminal Investigative 
Measures in the European Context, Paper delivered at conference referenced in fn. 1, unpublished paper on file with 
author. Wade, M. ‘Judicial Control: The CJEU and the Future of Eurojust’ ERA Forum (2013) 14:201–214, p. 206 et 
seq. and Wade, M. ‘General Principles of Transnationalised Criminal Justice? Exploratory Reflections’ Utrecht Law 
Review, Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) 165-183, p. 170 et seq. 
27 See e.g. McBride, J. Human Rights and Criminal Procedure (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2009), p. 
243 
28 See N. Mole and C. Harby op cit., p. 46 et seq. 
29 Indeed a recent review by the European Parliament determined that Eurojust for example tend to strive for informal 
decisions even where they have formal powers to impose a decision. 
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the rules on judicial review of that particular jurisdiction. This will often not reflect the nature or complexity 
of the process behind this decision. Indeed, in transnational contexts, particular provision for informality 
appears to have been made (or at least no reason for formality recognised). As one defence lawyer 
interviewed comments, when requesting information explaining the grounds for a decision e.g. as to court 
jurisdiction, the response will invariably be „Eurojust is not obliged to enter the basis of this decision in the 
file.“30 Defence needs in this regard have been forgotten even in relation to the most basic; that for 
information, let alone in connection with possibly being heard on the subject. Seen from this perspective, it is 
hardly astonishing that some defence lawyers feel they face an entirely different criminal justice system 
when working in a trans-national context. 
 
III.d. Transnational Criminal Law as Repressive Criminal Procedure 
This status quo is entirely understandable if one recognises transnational criminal justice mechanisms, 
institutions and in the European case procedures as developing from state desire to co-operate in criminal 
justice matters. The mechanisms developed are driven by legitimate state interest in (effective) prosecution. 
As Boister points out in his seminal text on the subject, this usually means that such contexts are dominated 
by ideas of criminal law and punishment held by dominant states with the broader context ignored.31 
Transnational criminal law, and European criminal justice as a particular form of it, are systems based on a 
prosecution focused, repressive view of criminal justice. 
 
Another way of seeing transnational criminal justice mechanisms is as an attempt to ensure investigators and 
prosecutors can overcome the conventional boundaries of their jurisdictions. The very point is that the 
identity of the perpetrator, including his or her nationality, becomes of lesser importance as a trans-
nationalised investigative machinery gets under way and the logic of that ‘system’32 takes over to ensure the 
suspect is charged and brought to justice before the appropriate court – wherever that may be - as dictated by 
the rationale of the set-up used. From a governance and criminal justice administration point, this is logical 
and all well and good. 
 
Undeniably, however, the individual subject to such investigations is not changed by any trans-national 
setting framing them; he or she retains his or her identity and is indeed likely to attach some importance to it. 
An individual will retain his or her nationality and the expectation that any criminal process will retain the 
characteristics of the Constitution associated with it. His or her perception of what constitutes criminal 
behaviour will be informed primarily by his or her national legislative context. A suspect or “person of 
interest” to an investigation will usually have expectations of defence rights and procedural guarantees, 
which accompany it, and any ensuing trial formed by what constitutes the norm in their domestic legal 
system. A number of European Union Member States including France, Italy and the Netherlands, for 
example, grant their suspected citizens a right to investigate their own cases in parallel to the police.33 
European and transnational criminal law pay little heed to this right. It is expected by a significant number of 
the subjects of their investigations nevertheless. The logic of transnational criminal justice as a state need 
driven phenomenon naturally ignores such features. If criminal justice at this level is to adhere to the 
tradition of bearing both a sword and shield function, this is, however, a point requiring urgent attention. 
These arrangements after all aim to achieve justice; this is far more than just the efficient fulfilment of a 
(collective) executive desire to prosecute and punish – and it is famously something, which must not only be 
achieved but also perceived as such.34 
 
III.e. The Individual Rights-holder and Transnational Criminal Justice  
                                                 
30 Interview on file with author. 
31 Boister, N. ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ European Journal of International Law (2003) 14, no. 5, pp. 958-959. 
32 There is no denying that the transnational and European contexts feature only skeletal or fledgling systems, 
nevertheless, these cooperative contexts do feature important common assumptions to facilitate cross-border workings 
of domestic criminal justice authorities, which lend them a different character. 
33 Wade, M. ‘Part III – Present National Criminal Justice Structures, II.C.1.e.bb. – Active Participation in the 
Investigative Stage’, in Sieber, U. and Wade, M. Structures of European Criminal Justice – Volume 1: Central Findings 
(Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, in press). 
34 Cases such as that of Andrew Symeou and a multitude of others documented by Fair Trials International – see the 
Justice in Europe Campaign – available at: http://www.fairtrials.org/campaigns/eu-defence-rights/justice-in-europe/ – 
contribute to a growing perception that EU justice mechanisms do not achieve justice. How damaging this can be to any 
such “system” is easily recognisable in the current UK protocol 36 opt-out debate. 
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Particularly the situation pertaining to European criminal law highlights this gulf between citizen and 
transnational criminal justice level. The EU context demonstrates that even successful,35 frequently used 
instruments such as the EAW are subject to significant criticism for disproportionate use potentially 
endangering the human rights of suspected individuals (see supra). So much so in fact, that the EAW has 
become the chief bone of contention for British politicians leading calls for the UK to withdraw from 
criminal justice mechanisms at this level.36  The difficulties faced in negotiating vital aspects of the Roadmap 
provisions (see supra) only underline the fragile nature of even this more robust transnational criminal justice 
forum. The European Union is currently able to criminalise acts, can facilitate arrest, the surrender of 
individuals and their trial and imprisonment in a foreign country. It is not, however, able to effectively secure 
translation rights,37 let alone provide individuals with the access to a lawyer they legitimately expect across 
the same territory.38 These latter matters should improve in time given that a number of legislative 
instruments have been introduced aiming to tackle deficiencies in these areas.39 Only time will tell whether 
the sluggish implementation so far will nevertheless result in effective provision. However, the delay 
between the introduction of the EAW and these measures alone, clearly demonstrates that we are dealing 
with a system, which allows prosecutors to run before defence practitioners are provided with the tools to 
allow them even to walk. 
 
Specific doubts have been voiced concerning the European arrest warrant because of the position it is 
increasingly demonstrated as placing citizens in. Citizens imprisoned or detained using the European arrest 
warrant are increasingly being demonstrated as routinely deprived of their basic criminal justice rights and 
left extremely vulnerable by their linguistic isolation in foreign detention alone. Surrender following trials in 
abstentia leads not infrequently to long prison sentences being enforced without the surrenderee (who is 
frequently raising significant evidential or procedural arguments) afforded the retrial promised to the 
surrendering state.40 Clearly, these citizens’ rights (to present their case at trial) are not sufficiently protected 
by the Member States in the course of criminal justice pursued via European criminal law; despite these 
nations’ sovereign claims that this is the case. If promises, which should secure these rights, are routinely 
broken without consequence such statements ring hollow. Furthermore, the ECHR does not provide 
sufficiently strong standards to ensure that even such relatively simple rights provision is factually secured. 
Transnational law, whilst not featuring several of the mechanisms, which contribute to the efficiency of the 
European arrest warrant,41 is likely marked by precisely the same lacuna. European law and transnational 
criminal law inherently bear the potential to endanger individual rights both in relation to substantive and 
procedural matters. Given that EU criminal justice and transnational criminal law are designed only to ensure 
the perpetrators of crimes are not able to evade justice, any potential they bear to create injustice raises 
sensitive issues as to their rationale.  Argument concerning such matters goes to the core raison d’etre of 
such set ups and severely undermines the legitimacy of these bodies of law and the institutions implementing 
them. 
                                                 
35 COM (2011) 175 Final. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States. Brussels 11.4.2011. 
36 Boffey, D. ‘Theresa May faces Tory backlash over retaining European arrest warrant’ The Observer (11 May 2013). 
37 Legislated for as measure A of the Roadmap discussed above – see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-
rights/right-translation/index_en.htm and Fair Trials International Defence Rights in Europe (London, 2012) 
http://www.fairtrials.org/publications/defence-rights-in-europe-the-right-to-interpretation-and-translation-in-criminal-
proceedings/ - but according to Fair Trials International only implemented by 50% of member states one month past the 
implementation deadline (October 2013). 
38 See e.g. Heard, C. and Mansell, D. ‘The European Arrest Warrant: The Role of Judges when Human Rights are at 
Risk’ New European Criminal Law Journal (2011 no. 2) pp. 133-147 and 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-rights/index_en.htm>.  
39 See Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, Directive 2013/48/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in 
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to 
communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty. 
40 See e.g. Fair Trials International Defence Rights in Europe (London, 2012) available at: 
<http://www.fairtrials.net/publications/policy-and-campaigns/defence-rights-in-the-eu-report/>. 
41 Above all, the fundament of mutual recognition and the absence of the double criminality requirement for a broad 
category of crimes ensures the EAW particular efficiency. 
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The traditional binding of criminal justice processes to nation states means they are set within particular 
constitutional contexts. The protective nature of many mechanisms within national criminal justice processes 
stems from precisely this. It is this setting which defines the relationship between executive and citizen; 
individuals’ expectations of how they will be treated and allowed to (inter-)act during such processes will be 
deeply marked by this. Transnational criminal justice, as mentioned above, seeks to alleviate the handicaps 
caused to cross-border investigation by the binding of criminal justice agents to any given nation state’s 
territory. In so doing, transnational and particularly European criminal law should be recognised as placing 
investigators and prosecutors on a different jurisdictional platform extending their reach and, to a certain 
extent, jurisdiction beyond the nation state. This ‘supranationalisation’ of criminal justice agents and certain 
key activities occurs in isolation and out of context, however. Critical commentary on the mechanisms, 
which provide for this levitation demonstrate that these areas of law have resulted in criminal justice agents 
unfettered by their usual constitutional context.42 Unsurprisingly the individuals subject to their decisions are 
in turn exposed to unacceptable threats to their constitutional rights. Thus we find ourselves facing a 
situation in which procedural guarantees and defence rights are all too plausibly undermined as highlighted 
by the EuroNEEDs results explored above. Above all the access to remedies is made extremely difficult; as 
highlighted by Klip, even where criminal charges are brought against an individual, it will be extremely 
difficult to muster any evidence of rights infringements committed multi-laterally. Furthermore, many 
investigations will not end in a trial meaning that anyone suffering rights infringements during their course 
will be deprived even of a potential venue to which to complain about them. Such rights violations 
nevertheless remain potentially serious and the failure to provide for any redress a considerable source of 
injustice.43 
 
For the criminal justice context, the basic problem relates to an individual’s rights to insist upon the rights he 
or she holds in his or her usual constitutional setting; the expectation he or she legitimately places upon his 
or her government as to his or her participatory and defence rights in the course of criminal proceedings. In 
any transnationalised context, adopting the defence perspective, our concern must thus be any right to assert 
or insist upon such rights – or at least equivalent protection - where the executive of his or her nation state 
assigns powers impacting upon such rights to another governance level. 
There is currently, quite explicitly, however, no acknowledgement of a system and thus not of a potential to 
systematically change the relationship between governance level and the individual thus governed by the 
enhanced powers of supra-nationalised criminal justice networks. Given the collective boost provided to 
member state criminal justice authorities, however, unease at treating such investigations as legally the same 
creature as one run by national authorities alone is surely justified. 
 
Within the European Union, investigations can currently be lent strong support by OLAF, Eurojust and 
Europol who, within the logic of their mandates, appear above all as service institutions for the domestic 
criminal justice agencies of the member states. These European institutions facilitate an overview of criminal 
phenomena, unprecedented and unachievable by any domestic agency,44 they coordinate and guide, advise 
and facilitate the achievement of consensus amongst international groups of investigators and prosecutors.45 
They provide vital expertise and sometimes even operational support to ensure the successful investigation 
and bringing to justice of highly mobile and dangerous criminals. This is a result of member states’ 
recognition that their investigative agencies and prosecutors require enhanced intelligence;46 that 
                                                 
42 Thus, see e.g. the apparent release of EAW use from the principle of proportionality usually of constitutional rank in 
EU member states – European Commission (2011) op cit. 
43 See Klip, A. (2012), p. 464. 
44 Europol – e.g. TE-SAT 2012: Europol EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol 2012) 
available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf and Europol Trafficking 
Human Beings in the European Union (The Hague: Europol, 2011), available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/trafficking-in-human-beings-in-the-european-union-
2011.pdf. For OLAF e.g. OLAF The OLAF Report 2011 (Brussels: European Commission, 2012) p. 27 et seq. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/2011/olaf_report_2011.pdf. 
45 See Eurojust Annual Report 2011 (The Hague: Eurojust 2012), p. 15 et seq. available at: 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202011/Annual-
Report-2011-EN.pdf 
46 See articles 7 of the Europol Decision - Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol) (2009/371/JHA) L-121/37, and 13 of the Eurojust Decision - Council Decision 2009/426/JHA  of 16 
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investigations and prosecutions with cross-border elements are dependent upon co-ordination47 and that 
specialist legal expertise (e.g. in relation to the financial regulations of the EU) may be required to ensure 
their success48. The very existence of Europol and Eurojust attest to the fact that national agencies cannot 
necessarily handle transnational proceedings. 
 
IV.f. The Reality of Transnational Criminal Justice and the Need for Correction 
The reality of criminal justice pursued in transnational settings, is, however, that decisions of great impact 
for constitutional rights are made. In fact, in these settings, decisions routinely made as merely 
administrative in domestic settings, carry entirely different ramifications. For example, a decision 
determining or changing jurisdiction within a domestic context will not be recognised as affecting the legal 
position of an individual. Such a decision will usually involve the transfer of a case from one court to another 
in the interests of justice – also the defendant‘s – it is a matter concerning the proper administration of 
justice, no more. It is therefore not a matter for legal debate; a decision rightly left in the hands usually of a 
single judge who is deemed adequately equipped to consider all relevant factors. A hearing of the accused is 
not usually foreseen.  
When placed in the context of a trans-national prosecution, i.e. at a supra-national level, however, such a 
change takes on entirely other dimensions. A defendant likely has considerable concerns relating to where he 
will be tried when a variety of jurisdictions is possible. The language of proceedings, the likelihood of bail, 
detention conditions and factual circumstances that individual becomes exposed to will all change 
enormously, depending upon whom a cooperating group of prosecutors decide to entrust with bringing a case 
to justice.49 The individual, however, remains powerless to influence, let alone challenge any such decision. 
Eurojust – and any other facilitating institution – is formally regarded, at most, as the venue in which such 
decisions are taken. Legally the decision is one of the member state authority, which lodges charges. 
Consequently, the supra-national body involved cannot be held accountable by the individual affected by its 
activity, however significant it might be. Where such a decision is made, however, via e.g. a conference at 
Eurojust, this formally domestic decision has potentially been very significantly influenced by the other 
member states’ representatives who make up this supra-national entity. The legitimate desire of an individual 
to influence and even dispute the decision-making process is more than obvious. The reasonable expectations 
of an individual to at least be heard where his or her interests are affected in such a manner is legally (and 
likely factually) ignored in such circumstances because our legal perspective has not adapted to this reality. 
Decisions relating to forum are of even greater concern due to the spectre of potential forum shopping by 
supra-national institutions. Where prosecutors are left with a choice of forum and can elect to bring charges 
in a jurisdiction in which convictions are more easily achieved, the potential for an effective defence is 
strongly side-lined.50 
 
The need to adapt our legal and political perception also becomes apparent in relation to positive rights. A 
number of EU member states endow the defence and in some cases citizens themselves with a right to carry 
out an investigation on their own behalf. A jurisdiction which allows investigations piggybacking on the 
main police one – even if such rights are highly aspirational -undeniably disadvantages its citizens when 
provision is made for transnational criminal investigations which foresee no such thing. There are many 
                                                                                                                                                                  
December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view 
to reinforcing the fight against serious crime L-138/14. 
47 Thus the role ascribed to Eurojust: “to stimulate and improve the coordination, between the competent authorities of 
the Member States, of investigations and prosecutions in the Member States” article 3(1)a and “to improve cooperation 
between the competent authorities of the Member States” article 3(1)b of the Eurojust Decision - Council Decision of 
28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA), OJ L 
63/1, 06.03.2002. 
48 Thus the creation of OLAF – see e.g. article 2(5)c of Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the 
European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) (1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom) and see OLAF (2012), pp. 27 and 29. 
49 Because although the Eurojust Decision (article 7(2) of the amended Eurojust Decision) confers powers to the 
College to make binding decisions as regards jurisdiction, it tends not to exercise these, allowing for informal decision-
making see European Parliament The Future of Eurojust (Brussels: European Parliament 2012) pp. 96 and 100, 
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=73791. 
50 See e.g. Ambos, K. Internationales Strafrecht, 3rd ed. (Munich: Beck, 2011), p. 561. He discusses differences in 
admissibility of evidence as tempting in forum shopping terms, offences with extremely low conviction thresholds – 
such as s. 57 of the British Terrorism Act 2000, which requires only reasonable suspicion, naturally only, strengthen 
such argument. 
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arguments against allowing individuals investigative rights in transnational settings, citizens may 
nevertheless feel deeply disadvantaged in comparison to the expectations they have of criminal justice as 
informed by their domestic rights situation. Exceptional cases such as that of the Lawrence family in the UK 
(who brought a private prosecution in an attempt to bring their son’s murderers to justice thus reopening a 
case, which still occupies the British justice system 15 years later) show the importance such rights can 
bear.51 If such issues are not explicitly dealt with in framing the workings of any kind of criminal justice 
mechanism at a transnational level, citizens whose expectations are disappointed cannot but be expected to 
feel cheated and to seek discussion of such mechanisms as unjust and illegitimate. This is problematic 
because compliance with a system is increased when it is viewed as legitimate but also, in the case of 
transnational systems, because if they are viewed as illegitimate, they can be undermined (as for example is 
currently true of EU criminal justice. There political opponents of the supra-national level are utilising 
examples of injustice perpetuated by EU criminal law mechanisms, to undermine the standing of the EU 
altogether).  
 
Where possible they will, of course, seek legal recourse from any court accessible to them. A domestic court 
will likely find itself strongly challenged when asked to balance constitutional rights with international 
Treaty obligations. Any international court must fear a caseload spiralling out of control both in terms of 
volume and demand for expert understanding of component state constitutions. There can be little question 
that such matters should be dealt with by the legislature in framing transnational criminal justice mechanisms 
rather than left for potential conflict later. The making of good law for transnational contexts therefore 
demands that those making such laws – i.e. concluding treaties – recognise themselves as a legislature with 
corresponding duties as are usually found in domestic systems.52 As long as provision for transnational 
criminal justice occurs on an ad hoc, executive-driven basis, there is unlikely to be any adequate provision 
for the defence or any other participant in the criminal justice process, which is not readily championed by 
representatives of government or criminal justice agencies. The European Parliament is arguably already 
driving relevant EU processes in this direction as it takes up its legislative role post-Lisbon.53 If provision is 
to be made for adequate defence provision for all individuals who face criminal proceedings as these 
increasingly become transnationalised, the way in which such law is conceptualised and made must change 
more broadly. 
 
These legal settings expose individuals to investigations, which by their nature should perhaps be regarded as 
a different animal. Decisions within them bear potential to affect an individual and his or her rights and 
interests in a magnified manner. The risks to liberty are greater but the provision for rights lesser. The rights 
and expectations individuals have will invariably be factually rendered less important as their ability to assert 
them diminishes and so the disjunctive between citizen (with legitimate, rights-based expectations) and 
governance level (the supra-national organisation associated with mechanisms or legislation, which fail to 
provide for these rights) will increase. The fact is that rights and safeguards are strongly related to the 
domestic processes of member states. As criminal proceedings which interfere significantly with rights (and 
which traditionally require safeguards of them to be in place) are shifted to another governance level, 
logically these rights and safeguards must receive similar treatment if they are not to lose all meaning. It is 
inconceivable that citizens agree to membership of supranational organisations or entities in order for their 
rights to be undermined.54 The (criminal justice-related) Eurosceptiscism currently gripping many across 
Europe can often be seen as vocalisation of precisely this problem (or at least clever political manipulation of 
it). It is submitted, that the need to conceptualise transnational criminal justice work differently is a general 
need. In some cases, the failure to conceive rights anew in the EU and other transnational contexts is likely to 
                                                 
51 See BBC Stephen Lawrence Murder: A Timeline of how the Story Unfolded (London: BBC, 2014) available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26465916 
52 For an overview of legislative processes to create criminal law and criminal procedure law see Wade, M. ‘The 
Present Criminal Justice Structures at the National Level - Part 1.A.: Sources of Criminal Law’ in Sieber, U. and Wade, 
M. Structures of European Criminal Justice – Volume 1: Central Findings (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, in press). 
53 In accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure defined in article 289 TFEU. 
54 Indeed, in the EU context this is in breach of the Treaties. Articles 2 and 6 of the TEU state that the EU is bound by 
the rule of law and “the constitutional traditions common to the member states.” 
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challenge the feeling and perception of justice and fair process not only in the eyes of any suspect or 
individual directly affected by such a case but also in society more broadly.55 
 
Ultimately, such a situation will result in courts being asked to remedy legal situations in order to secure an 
individual’s rights simultaneously placing them at the centre of what should be a political decision. It is 
simply untenable for the executive to expose its judiciary to such a sensitive political and diplomatic 
position. As Hassemer asserts, courts must in such situations demand that their foreign equivalents and 
criminal justice colleagues provide guarantees that certain rights and assurances will be given and are lent 
factual meaning (such as a retrial in which the surrenderee can actively participate).56 They cannot step down 
from their primary duty to guarantee an individual his or her constitutional context and any executive would 
be wise to avoid a scenario in which its representatives end up requesting that a court do so.  
 
 
IV. Securing Safeguards and Defence Rights 
Within the EU context, the need to include a conception of rights at that level has often been argued as 
unnecessary because all member states are also signatories to the ECHR. Clearly, the drafting of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter the Charter) demonstrates that a majority of 
member states are not ultimately convinced by this argument. Nevertheless, it remains Europe’s central 
rights statement and may be drawn upon also for the broader Council of Europe setting. This in itself is also 
the source of significant portions of transnational criminal justice legislation for its signatory states.57  
In some cases the Convention indeed provides a legal path to determining common values within the broader 
European context and therefore for demanding specific rights protection mechanisms, also in transnational 
criminal proceedings. Constitutional values and such rights statements are, after all, the basis for procedural 
safeguards and defence rights. These can clearly only be provided for if any transnational setting agrees not 
only upon the terms for common prosecution but also a common values basis. In some cases, the European 
Human Rights Court has determined very specific protections as resulting from these. The case of Salduz v 
Turkey58 for instance has provided a clear requirement of access to legal advice during police custody as a 
concretisation of fair trial rights unless exceptional circumstances speak against allowing such access.59 A 
strong line of case law upholds the complete prohibition of torture or degrading treatment or punishment 
clearly demonstrating this as a common value.60 ECHR case law is further instructive in determining more 
detailed principles flowing from such fundamental principles, for example, when a charge must be viewed as 
criminal or several concrete requirements of the principle of equality of arms.61 
 
The Court, however, operates post facto and in relation to cases of all manner. Its work is not specific to 
cases of relevance to the nitty-gritty of criminal justice systems cooperating closely in transnationalised 
settings. Ultimately even amongst the EU Member States, there is such divergence in rights standards 
flowing from constitutional values62 that it would be illusionary to expect the ECHR, even via the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, to provide a sufficiently tight system of rights protection to 
accompany transnationalised processes even in this specific setting. Clearly, this problem only increases with 
the jurisdictional area of transnational criminal law. 
 
                                                 
55 See e.g. the Justice in Europe Campaign of Fair Trials International <http://www.fairtrials.org/campaigns/eu-defence-
rights/justice-in-europe>/. 
56 Hassemer, W. ‚Strafrecht in einem europaeischen Verfassungsvertrag‘ ZStW 116 (2004) 2, pp. 304-319, p. 318. Note, 
however, Fair Trials International’s reports that such assurances are given but often not respected – see FTI (2012). 
57 Not least the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/030.htm) as well as a multitude of specialist conventions relating e.g. 
to terrorism, drug-smuggling, human trafficking, cybercrime, etc. 
58 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber) judgment of 27 November 2008, Salduz v Turkey, appl. no. 36391/02, [2008] ECHR 
1542. 
59 Para. 55 of the judgment 
60 Chahal v United Kingdom, [1996] ECHR 54; Saadi v Italy, [2008] ECHR 179 and indeed Othman (Abu Qatada) v 
United Kingdom, [2012] ECHR 56. 
61 See e.g. Trechsel, S. Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 36 et seq. 
and pp. 94 et seq. 
62 See Carrera, S., De Somer, M, Petkova, B. ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights 
Tribunal’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 49/August 2012, p. 5. 
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A further source of imprecision is the so-called margin of appreciation63 applied by the Court when 
interpreting whether or not a state’s rights-securing mechanisms comply with the Convention. The Court’s 
deference to executives’ judgements in difficult situations means that the ECHR and its jurisprudence will 
not always provide for clear standards. The Strasbourg Court looks at rights in situations in which they are 
tested rather than to make a concrete declaration of the norm. Not surprisingly, this leads to an imprecision 
or watering down of the standards set. 64 This ensures that the idealistic Convention has provided a forum for 
the race to the bottom. 
 
Even beyond such considerations, the problem is that the unfairness of transnationalised criminal 
proceedings will stem often from the process as a whole and the incompatibility of procedural protection 
systems with each other. Each step of any process may well be Convention compliant because it is within the 
realm of what the Court accepts or rather part of a process, which the Court views as fair overall, 
nevertheless the combination of parts of different states’ processes may result in unfairness. Thus, for 
example, a citizen whose procedural rights are breached during the investigation in jurisdiction A would 
have redress in that jurisdiction through the exclusion of any product of the breach as evidence in a trial 
against him. If, however, he is surrendered for trial in jurisdiction B this protection would be lost if 
jurisdiction B allowed all evidence to be admitted no matter what its origin (as is the case e.g. in Sweden, 
which places great trust in the judicial evaluation of evidence probity). Such differences in procedural stages 
are entirely Convention acceptable because protection simply has to be provided in a balanced way within 
the logic of a country’s procedure (and Sweden for example has far higher protective standards to ensure 
investigative actions such as wire-tapping are carried out legally as they occur. The logic of the Swedish 
system is, however, lost when a suspect is tried there having been wire-tapped in another Member State).65 
This is the legal lottery referred to above. 
 
Values determined under the ECHR – recognised as a relatively strong human rights instrument - are 
therefore subject to interpretation within the specific setting as well as to the margin of appreciation. 
Demanding that ECHR jurisprudence develop specific mechanisms of protection suitable for ensuring rights 
are respected in proceedings across a number of jurisdictions is asking too much. The ECHR was, after all, 
not conceived of as a mechanism to regulate co-operation or harmonisation. Even where the Court can 
develop specific requirements – as it has done e.g. in the case of Salduz v Turkey, it cannot do so at a rate 
which keeps pace with the evolution of transnational criminal justice. 
 
If one accepts that transnationalised criminal justice processes may need to be viewed as legally different, it 
is not difficult to imagine that rights protection within them may also require specialised instruments. The 
central point is to recognise such proceedings as part of a whole, which is transnational in nature. Within the 
EU context, the drafting of the Charter provides an interesting opportunity. Its advent into Union law alone 
demonstrates that the Member States felt a need for standards more concrete than those offered by the 
ECHR. As the European Court of Justice embraces its role as the Charter’s guarantor, Article 47 – which 
confers a right to an effective remedy upon anyone whose rights and freedoms (as guaranteed under Union 
law) have been violated by an executive power – provides significant potential to allow such procedures to 
be adjudicated with the necessary transnational perspective. Only time will tell what is made of this 
opportunity. 
 
Effective rights protection cannot, however, be achieved by awaiting court jurisprudence determining 
common values. The better approach is to ensure that repressive transfers of power to the European and other 
transnational criminal justice contexts are accompanied by an appropriate, rights-securing setting. Only when 
governments recognise that they cannot, for example, view an arrest warrant in isolation and that if they 
legislate for arrests to become effective across borders, they must also look to liberty-securing mechanisms 
around them, provision for criminal justice be achieved transnationally. 
 
                                                 
63 See e.g. Marks, S. ‘Civil Liberties at the Margin’, 1995 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 1, pp. 69-95. 
64 For example, the seemingly concrete requirement that a detainee is informed immediately of the facts forming the 
basis of the charge against him or her was watered down by the case of Fox, Cambell and Hartley v United Kingdom 
[1990] ECHR 18, especially Para. 41. 
65 See Berling, G. ‘The Criminal Justice System in Sweden’ in Sieber, U. and Wade, M Structures of European 
Criminal Justice - Volume 4 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot in press). 
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Securing procedural guarantees and defence rights in transnational criminal justice settings such as that of 
the EU requires political and legal recognition that such processes must be acknowledged as part of a system. 
The aim of that system must further be recognised as criminal justice. On this basis, such systems must be 
analysed to determine what constitutes neuralgic points in such proceedings. This is what transnational 
criminal law thus far tends to do for the prosecution. The need to do the equivalent and to consider the 
defence perspective is hopefully now apparent. Without fundamental recognition of the prosecutorial slant of 
such systems thus far and the urgent need to correct this, no progress can be made. 
 
Even if this is achieved, much work remains. The EU context demonstrates all too clearly the divergence of 
procedural safeguards and defence rights to be found in cooperating nation states. There is no getting around 
the need to determine core values held by all in criminal proceedings. Any legislature providing for 
transnational criminal justice must also identify the procedural guarantees and defence rights considered vital 
by all citizens within the area whose law it is reforming. Where some citizens stand to lose rights which may 
be regarded as sensitive by some but not all, there is further potential to explore whether functional 
equivalents can be achieved so that such a loss can be ameliorated. Another alternative is, of course, to 
imbue the transnational justice level with the highest rights standards. Failing that, any governance level 
depriving citizens of rights will have to answer to them for that one way or another. The path taken so far in 
transnational proceedings, namely simply to ignore the potential for injustice and thus to allow 
fundamentally legitimate mechanisms to fall into disrepute is clearly counter-productive as demonstrated by 
current attempts to dismantle EU criminal justice co-operation. In order to protect what currently works in 
transnational proceedings it is vital to address the imbalances that characterise them. First and foremost, this 
requires recognition that an effective defence is an important tool to ensuring justice is done. 
 
Above all, the effective provision for defence rights and procedural guarantees surely requires an assignment 
of institutional responsibility for overall fairness. Doubtlessly court oversight and review responsibilities 
must be provided for. Fundamentally, however, it is asserted that the changing character of prosecutors and 
investigators working with transnational mechanisms and with or in such institutions must be recognised as 
different. Where such practitioners – no matter what their usual day job - are factually working as European 
(or in other transnational contexts as servants of that governance level) practitioners, they must be identified 
as such. Thus any member state investigator may find him or herself as representing e.g. the European 
executive and any prosecutor may find him or herself as a quasi-judicial European practitioner. Recognition 
of this status must in turn bring with it clarity that this changes their duties and the usual terms of their office. 
In such functions, they owe a duty of care to those they make decisions about. Such practitioners are usually 
required to take an oath of office in which they swear loyalty to the citizens and the constitution of their 
jurisdiction. Where the latter expands, so must their responsibilities. It cannot be that suspects – and indeed 
increasingly victims – are rendered anonymous and “rightless” in transnational settings when such 
proceedings factually expose them to greater, not lesser risks to their rights. This is an intolerable fiction, 
which citizens should not accept. Within the EU, the notion of EU citizenship and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union66 should give a foothold from which to argue this legally; the 
problem is to be found and requires recognition and remedy in other transnational contexts too, however. 
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